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]¥o. 6. 

REPORTS OF THE NATIONAL WAR COMMITTEE 

OP THE CITIZENS OP NEW-TORK. 



REPORT 



COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO TAKE INTO CON- 
SIDERATION THE CONDITION OF 
WESTERN TEXAS. 



The Committee, to whom was referred a communication 
(on the part of the Union men of "Western Texas) earnestly 
requesting the influence of the National War Committee to 
induce the government to send a military force into Western 
Texas, submit the following report : 

Condition of the Union Men of Texas. 

The condition of the Union men of Western Texas de- 
mands the sympathy of the people of the loyal States, and 
entitles theui to a powerful eflFort on the part of the general 
government for their relief. From the beginning of the re- 
volt, in which the State of Texas was compelled to take an 
unwilling part, until the present time, a considei^ble portion 
of its population have been unwavering in their fidelity to 
the Union, and uncompromising in their refusal of aid or 
allegiance to the Confederate authorities. The treachery of 
General Twiggs, in turning over all the arms in the State to 
the insurgents, rendered the loyal men powerless to resist the 
act of secession, in its original inception ; and, surrounded by 



Li 



2 

an armed force, tliey have been unable either to leave the 
State in any numbers, to seek protection among the friendly 
Mexicans on their border, or from the -blockading vessels 
which have, at times, been stationed on the coast. 

Parallel between Texas and Tennessee. 

In this respect their situation is not exceptional, and argu- 
ments of equal force might be urged in behalf of the sufler- 
ing loyalists of Eastern Tennessee, whose position presents to 
this extent a parallel with that of Western Texas. 

But here the parallel ceases. The government has hesi- 
tated, and perhaps wisely, as to the propriety of sending arms 
into Eastern Tennessee, fearing, and it may be assured, that 
the arms thus supplied would not alone enable the inhabit- 
ants to throw oif the yoke of the usurpers ; and that either 
a military movement, involving an entire change of the plan 
of campaign, must be made in that direction, or else that the 
arms supplied would, from the inability of the inhabitants to 
maintain themselves, fall into the hands of the rebels, and be 
used against the very citizens they were destined to aid. 

It is worthy of passing question whether the plan of enter- 
ing Eastern Tennessee in force a year since, and gaining the 
aid of a large, loyal population from that and neighboring 
States, while driving, wedge-like, a powerful army into the 
heart of the South, and, to use a military expression, operating 
upon the diameter of the circle, would not have been more 
fruitful of results than tliat adopted — of an extended attack 
on the circumference of the circle, on the famous anaconda 
line from Richmond to Memphis. And it is not improper to 
remark, that if there were a doubt as to the respective merits 
of the two plans of campaign, that doubt should have oper- 
ated in favor of a movement, which, while it divided the 
strength and territory of the enemy, would also have ful- 
filled that first duty for which government is constituted — the 
protection of the governed. 

The case of Western Texas differs, in this respect, from 
that of Eastern Tennessee, and an aid to its inhabitants in- 
volves no radical change of military plan. JS"© large armies 



<::5'" 



are needed to enable the gallant Rangers of that State to 
maintain their independence. Their refuge is on the moun- 
tains and on the friendly soil of the neighboring republic. 
The occupation of the Mississippi by Federal gunboats sepa- 
rates their territory from the great military power of the Con- 
federacy, and they ask but for arms to reclaim their State 
from anarchy and barbarism, and restore it to the govern- 
ment of the United States. With the Eio Grande for a base 
of operations, they feel confident of their ability to maintain 
their position against all the power the rebels can concentrate 
against them, west of the great river ; or, in case of tempo- 
rary reverse, they could cross the Rio Grande, and fall back 
upon the soil of a friendly power, which the Confederates, 
who have already a war on hand sufficient to tax their ut- 
most strength, would not dare to invade, and render hostile. 

Political Importance of Texas to the Fkee States. 

The interest of their situation is not, however, confined to 
considerations peculiar to themselves. The position of Texas 
is of extreme importance in its relation to the free States, in 
the great contest of opinion now waging between the princi- 
ples of free and slave labor. 

The territory of Texas contains an area of 274,000 square 
miles ; an area six and a half times as large as that of the 
State of IS^ew-York ; an area nearly as large as that of France 
and Spain combined. 

The act of 1845, under which Texas was admitted into the 
Union, provides, that " new States, of convenient size, not 
exceeding four in number, in addition to said State of Texas, 
and having sufficient population, may hereafter, by the con- 
sent of said State, be formed out of the territory thereof, 
which shall be entitled to admission under the provisions of 
the Federal Constitution." The population is, by the last 
census,* now sufficiently large, and the interests sufficiently 
diverse, to admit of separation. There is already, as in Vir- 
ginia, a wide distinction between the character, habits and 

* Census of 1860—421,649 free, 182,566 slave. Total population, 604,215. 



modes of industry of the Western and Eastern portions of the 
State. In the West, among the mountains and on the table 
land, the population is chiefly white, a large proportion Ger- 
man settlers, all attached to the policy of free labor and free 
soil. To the eastward, on the slopes and the low land, to- 
wards the Gulf, the culture is mainly of cotton and sugar, 
and the laboring classes are mostly slave. Here the political 
parallel between Virginia and Texas ceases. Constitutional 
questions arise which render the division of Virginia embar- 
rassing as a precedent, although there is no doubt that the 
interest of her western loyal population would be greatly 
benefited by it. For, if on any grounds of policy, whether 
local or national, the division of a State can be consented to, 
the wise check upon legislation by the Senate may be entirely 
destroyed, and the people of the large States, chafing under 
the inequalities to which their fathers consented in the forma- 
tion of the Constitution, may seek to divide into smaller 
organizations to correct such inequalities. So dangerous are 
innovations ! 

This objection does not apply in the case of Texas, the 
act of annexation contemplating a division. This capacity of 
division was introduced into the act by the foresight of 
Southern statesmen, who proposed, in this mode, to retain an 
equipoise in the Senate, and postpone the certain future pre- 
ponderance of the free States in the Senate. 

If aided to recover the State authority, and to maintain 
themselves, the Texans will apply to the next Congress for 
the division contemplated, and thus one or two more free 
States can be carved from the borders of secession to secure, 
beyond contingency, tlie immediate preponderance of the 
free State interest, even though the Confederates should lay 
down iheir arms, and abandoning the contest in the field, re- 
turn again to the political arena, and seek in the future, as 
in the past, to control or confine the legislation of the country 
in the halls of Congress. 

Thus would these political engineers be "hoist with their 
own petard," and a cordon be established about slavery which 
will forever prevent its extension. 



MiLiTAEY Importance of Texas. — Its ocupation necessakt 
TO complete the Blockade. 

This loyal cordon is not only necessary in the future, in 
a political sense, but it is doubly necessary now, in a military 
point of view. On the borders of Texas alone the Confed- 
eracy is not blockaded, and the material blockade is as essen- 
tial to the immediate success of the Union arms as the moral 
blockade is to the ultimate triumph of the Union cause. So 
long as the rebels are in possession of the immediate Mexican 
borders on the banks of the Rio Grande, they can, and they 
do, carry on an easy and constant trade of very considerable 
extent with the neighboring Mexicans, and with foreigners 
located near the confines for the express purpose of supply- 
ing the wants of the rebel government. The goods thus des- 
tined are landed at some of the small sea-ports of Mexico, and 
are easily transported across the country. At present, this 
trade is hardly in the form of barter, most of the importations 
being paid for abroad by Confederate agents ; but ere long 
regular lines of communication will be established, by which 
the products of Texas, which makes, at the present time, 
400,000 bales of cotton, and will, without any breach of the 
law of nations, find an outlet through Mexican territory for 
direct shipment abroad. 

To complete the cordon and entirely prevent the continu- 
ance of this growing trade, it is only necessary to establish 
the Unionists in arms on the border of the Rio Grande. 
Those most familiar with their present position, and author- 
ized to represent them, state unhesitatingly, that this can be 
done by a gun-boat, to protect the landing, a few launches, 
with howitzers to keep the river clear, 15,000 stand of rifles, 
5,000 carbines and revolvers, and two or three batteries of rifled 
artillery, to meet the smooth bore guns surrendered by Twiggs, 
and now in position on the Southern border. 

These are the considerations which present themselves to 
the mind in the study of the position of Texas and its impor- 
tant relations to the government, the people and the policy of 



the United States. They are full of interest, and suggestive 
of important consequences as they are appreciated or neg- 
lected. The Committee are of opinion, that in no direction 
can such valuable results be reached with the same moderate 
expenditure. These reasons alone are sufficient to warrant a 
strong appeal to the authorities at Washington, for early and 
effective action. 

Texas in its Fokeign Relations. 

Other considerations present themselves, of a character in- 
finitely more grave, and which involve, not only the destiny 
of the United States, but the peace of the world. 

The designs of the strange inscrutable man who wields the 
power and directs the destinies of France, are beginning to 
unfold tliemselves. The scheme of a military occupation of 
Mexico by France, which England and Spain shrunk from 
participating in, is daily becoming more defined. The expe- 
ditions grow in proportion ; recent information indicates that 
the force will be carried up to 80,000 men; that its object is 
the complete military occupation of the country, the posses- 
sion of the silver and gold mines, and the establishment of a 
railway thoroughfare to the Pacific, probably over the Tehu- 
antepec route. The journals state, that " the engineer w^io 
has been sent out will not locate a road from Yera Cruz to 
the capital, until after he has located a road from the Gulf of 
Mexico to the Pacific ; a road intended to counteract the Pa- 
cific Rail-Eoad of the Americans." 

"What mode of conquest will be adopted by the French is 
not apparent. It is hardly possible that they will under- 
take to colonize the country they conquer. Colonization is 
not the form of French development. As a colonist, the 
Frenchman does not retain his individuality, but rapidly as- 
similates to the race or tribe to which he is joined. This is a 
featm-e not favorable to the mother country. Tlie spirit of 
the government is averse to colonization. Algeria is the ex- 
ception, an exception deemed necessary to counteract the ab- 
sorbmg schemes of England and to offset her Indian empire. 
Algeria has been, moreover, the nursery of the French sol- 



dier ; the school in which the French oflScer has acquired 
practical knowledge of that profession on which the glory of 
France depends. 

The occupation of Kome by the French soldiery, against 
the clear wish of the Italian people, indicates the mode in 
which the .conquest of Mexico will probably be effected. 
Some Mexican chieftain will be set up as the satrap of France, 
and be maintained in his power by French bayonets. Tliis is 
more in the nature of the new school of French politics, 
which would hardly justify the enthronement of a European 
prince against the popular will. 

Either project is full of danger to the United States, and 
will involve them, at no distant day, in a war with France ; 
and if, as is not improbable in the secret diplomacy of Napo- 
leon and Palmerston, there exists an arrangement, by which 
no bar will be made to French projects in Mexico, while 
England carries out those designs on Central America, which 
her occupation and appropriation of every island or rock on 
the coast seem to indicate, the contest may be with the two 
hostile and aggressive powers combined. 

Immediate Dangers of Fkench Occtjpation. 

There is danger, however, more imminent than this, and 
so patent as to need no searching for it in the dark corners of 
diplomacy. 

The French army will soon be on the borders of the Rio 
Grande del ISTorte, and in full military occupation of its south 
bank. The Confederate forces already hold the northern 
bank of this most important river, a river only second in 
magnitude to the Mississippi on this continent : this " Great 
River of the North," which takes its rise 2,000 miles away 
among the snow-capped mountains of the Sierra Madre, far up 
in the territory of Utah. 

Even if no change be made in the political features of Mex- 
ico, under the sway of the French army, large supplies of 
arms and all materials of war will be readily exchanged for 
cotton and sugar, by French agents, and an interference on 
the part of the United States will become absolutely neces- 



8 

sary, and a collision probably ensue ; a collision, perhaps, 
sought as a casus belli by more than one European state. 

Other and more important complications will arise, in the 
event of a change in the political features of Mexico. A 
new power will be set up — perhaps consul — perhaps presi- 
dent — perhaps king. This new power will recognise the 
Southern Confederacy, and at once enter into commercial 
treaties with it. An exclusive inland trade will spring up? 
promoted by French capital, with all the adjuncts of rail- 
roads and steam communication, which will draw the cotton 
and sugar of the whole country west of the Mississippi, 
Texas, Louisiana and Arkansas, to points of shipment on 
the Mexican coasts, where French fleets already ride at 
anchor. 

By the law of nations, recognition alone provides no cause 
of war ; and this trade, so beneficial to the cause of the rebels, 
could only be arrested by the blockade of the Mexican ports. 
But blockade is war with Mexico, and war with France also, 
who will have established an alliance, offensive and defensive, 
with the new power- — perhaps with England also, who 
would doubtless complain should we blockade a Mexican 
port for such reasons. 

The subject is full of contingencies — some immediate — 
some remote — all of sufficient importance to render instant 
action on the part of the United States government not only 
necessary, but imperative. There should be no delay in the 
dispatch of a strong force to recover Texas, and to serve as 
an army of observation on the movements of France upon 
the territory of the neighboring and friendly republic. 

In the opinion of the Committee, no subject, after the im- 
mediate safety of "Washington, presents itself with such force, 
and so immediately demands the energetic action of the 
government ; and they advise that it be urged, without delay, 
upon the President and the Secretary of "War. 

The Committee desire to express their thanks to Mr. Ed- 
ward Lee Plumb, of the United States Legation in Mexico — 
a gentleman of experience in the diplomatic relations of that 
country, and familiar with its politics — for the kindness with 
which he has imparted information on points of interest ; and 



9 

they submit a paper on the question, drawn by him, as also 
a memorandum of what is needed for an expedition such as 
is called for by the emergency, drawn by a gentleman versed 
in the affairs of Texas at the present time ; both of which, 
in the opinion of the Committee, should be laid before the 
government. 

The Committee having thus completed the duty assigned 
to them, request to be discharged. 

John Austin Stevens, Jr., "j 

Hugo Wesendonck, >- Committee. 

R. D. Lathrop, ] 

Mw-YorJc, Septemher 29, 1862. 



The foregoing report was read to the National War Com- 
mittee on the 29th, and unanimoiisly adopted by the Com- 
mittee, and a delegation, consisting of Messrs. Walbridge, 
Field, Stevens, Lathrop and Wesendonbk, was appointed to 
present the same to the President and Secretary of War. 

John Austin Stevens, Jr., 



APPENDIX. 



Letter of Mr. E. L. Plumb on Western Texas and Mexico. 
ISTew-Tokk, September 24th, 1862. 

Dear Sir : 

In compliance with your request, I beg to submit the fol- 
lowing observations regarding the importance of the immedi- 
ate despatch of a federal force to occupy "Western Texas : 

The subject of sending a proper force to be landed in the 
vicinity of the mouth of the Rio Grande, to form a nucleus 
around which the Union men in Western Texas could unite 
preparatory to the division of that State, and the erection of 
a new free State along the Mexican frontier from ITew-Mexico 
to the Gulf, thus placing the seceding States within a cordon 
of free territory, has been for a long time and repeatedly 
urged upon the attention of the administration. 

This has been done not only by suffering Union men rep- 
resenting a constituency, it is estimated, of over 50,000 in that 
immediate region, appealing for aid, for protection, for some 
attention on the part of the government, but by others who, 
from considerations of general policy, have not only long felt 
the necessity of shutting up this single remaining outlet from 
the Southern Confederacy, this facile means of communica- 
tion and prolific source of supplies, and now important chan- 
nel of Southern commerce, but have also long looked with 
apprehension either to the possible foray of hordes of armed 
men from the South upon our neighboring free republic with 
designs of conquest there, in case the Confederate forces 
should be driven before the Federal arms at the North ; or, ' 
upon probable arrangements in favor of the South with one 



11 

or more of the powers which have intervened in Mexico, in 
case temporary or permanent reverse should attend our. ef- 
forts to subdue the rebellion. 

But other apparently more- immediate necessities of the 
war have thus -far, perhaps necessarily, delayed any adequate 
attention to, or at least action upon, this important subject. 

Now, however, an emergency has arisen^ in which consid- 
erations under the head last above referred to, cause the sub- 
ject to assume a new and grave importance, imperatively 
demanding, the immediate attention and prompt action of the 
government. 

This is with reference to the attitude of France in Mexico, 
our recent reverses of arms at the North, and the danger of 
a recognition of the South by France, or some government 
which, for that purpose, she may set up in Mexico. 

By the mail from Europe, at hand to-day, advices are re- 
ceived that France has determined to send 80,000 men to 
Mexico, and, confirmatory of the presumption that their stay 
is to be permanent, it is also announced that the government 
of the Emperor is about to construct a railway from Yera Cruz 
to Orizaba as a military necessity, and that surveys are to be 
immediately made preparatory to the construction of a rail- 
road across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, {our Isthmus almost,) 
to forestall the construction of the Pacific Kailway across the 
United States. 

This course on the part of France, so openly looking to the 
military occupation of Mexico for the purpose of acquiring 
for her coffers the immense mineral and agricultural wealth 
of that country, is compelling her to desire and to seek the 
permanent separation of the South from the North ; and a 
recognition of the independence of the South 'must be the 
price she is prepared to pay, if necessary, for her acquisitions 
in Mexico. 

At the same time, France doubtless desires to avoid an 
open rupture with the North, if possible. . Still, the division 
of the Union is necessary to her plans in Mexico, and the 
South must therefore be indirectly, if not directly, supported. 

A recognition of the South by some government set up by 
France, or under her auspices, in Mexico, need not neces- 
sarily involve France with the North, and might be so man- 



12 

aged as not to bring her in at all ; yet such a recognition 
would be vastly useful to the South, and might be the means 
of causing other powers, say some of the minor European 
powers not accessible to our attack, under the influence of 
France, to also give their recognition, until it would be made 
to seem that the common voice of the world was in favor of 
the South, and the recognition of England and France would 
follow only when the act had passed beyond the possible pale 
of just cause of war. 

A recognition applied from a rich adjoining country like 
Mexico, would be infinitely more effective and useful to the 
South and dangerous to us, than if applied by some nation 
acting solely by sea ; and far more plainly so, when the gov- 
ernment making such recognition seeks to avoid its becoming 
cause of war. 

The remoteness of Mexico from our bases of supplies, and 
the difficulty of access of its interior, render it, under present 
circumstances, difficult of attack by us, while contiguity of 
territory opens it freely to the South. 

The danger attending a recognition from that quarter can 
only be averted by isolating the South from Mexico, by plac- 
ing a strip of territory occupied by our forces, and, if possi- 
ble, a free State, between it and Mexico. This would entirely 
alter the character and effect of any recognition from that 
direction, and confine its action, as in other cases, to the sea, 
where it can only be brought to bear upon ports already in 
our own possession or well blockaded. 

The domestic character of the rebellion would also be much 
more completely preserved by thus confining it to the inte- 
rior of our country, than by allowing it, as now, to embrace 
an apparently unbroken half, with an extended line of foreign 
frontier, and therefore having necessary relations with a 
foreign power, and thus with the family of nations, to main- 
tain. 

In its present position, Texas is almost an unoccupied, un- 
claimed territory. We have had no possession there for up- 
wards of eighteen months past ; and at the present time, 
although yielding nominal allegiance to the Confederacy, the 
Confederate government has but little hold upon it, and 
scarcely any troops, it is said, remain in its Western portion. 



13 

It might again set up as an independent republic, or it 
might be occupied, almost with impunity, by France. 

Of the 80,000 troops now going out, it is stated a large 
force will be stationed at Matamoras, immediately on its 
border, and will serve to keep open trade with the South, if 
for no other purpose. It is also stated that the Confederate 
government can send out 500,000 bales of cotton through 
Texas and the Mexican port of Matamoras, and is designing 
to do so, to be sold on its own account. 

To bring on a rupture with France, by any act of our own, 
would, at this crisis, be extremely undesirable ; but after any 
recognition of the South, on the part even of a government 
set up in Mexico, a movement on our part to re-occupy Texas 
might have a very different international bearing than if 
made before. Now we but act in clear pursuance of our 
right ; and once we hold even the Western half of Texas, and 
it is formed into a State sending members to our Congress, 
no recognition of the South could invalidate our title, nor 
our shutting up this channel of commerce be cause of com- 
plaint. Nor could troops or supplies reach the South except 
by marching across our territory, or openly forcing our block- 
ade at risk of war, brought on by the open act of any power 
so desiring to aid the South. 

The importance of the difference in the character of recog- 
nition, by thus isolating the South from Mexico, cannot be 
over-estimated. Once effected, it is very doubtful if the re- 
cognition would be made at all. 

In the present attitude of affairs and situation of Confede- 
rate troops, the isolation of the South can easily be effected, 
by immediately throwing a moderate force, with abundant 
supplies of arms, into "Western Texas, lauding them near the 
mouth of the Rio Grande, at once arousing the Union ele- 
ment there, (from which it is believed a large army can be 
raised,) calling an election, organizing a separate State govern- 
ment, and erecting the Western half of Texas into a free 
State. 

During such process, it is probable nearly the entire slave 
population would colonize in Mexico without other aid than 
that afforded by the presence of our armed forces. 



I 



14 

All accounts unite in representing the Union sentiment as 
very largely predominating throughout Western Texas, and 
the citizens as ready to rise whenever the presence of a 
moderate Federal force shall give them a reasonable prospect 
of success, and they can be furnished with the arms neces- 
sary for the movement. 

I am, Sir, 
Yery respectfully. 
Your obd't serv't, 

E. L. Plumb. 
To John A. Stevens, Jr., Esq., 

Present. 



Notes on a campaign in Western Texas^ setting forth some of 
the peculiar advantages of an immediate campaign of not 
less than twenty-f/ve thoxisand tnen^tolte hegun ofi the Rio 
Grande frontier of Texas. 

The Gulf coast, above the mouth of the Rio Grande, is the 
best point of attack, for the following reasons : 

A military movement from that quarter would at once 
afford an outlet for the escape of most of the Union men of 
the State, who would come off on horseback, and, on obtain- 
ing arms, &c., which they cannot now, by any means, get, 
would serve as Rangers. A movement commenced from 
any other quarter would cause them to be hemmed in by the 
rebel forces, now scattered along the Rio Grande, and sacri- 
ficed. The naturalized Mexicans and Germans, as well as 
the Americans, along the whole frontier, are almost unani- 
mously loyal, and will show themselves to be such when&ver 
they find that they will receive arms, &c,, and have assur- 
ances of permanent aid and protection. Some are now lying 
out in the mountains, and others are encamped on the Jlklexi- 
can side of the Rio Grande, waiting for the United States 
forces. Mules for trains, grain and forage can be got cheaper 
in the valley of the Rio Grande than elsewhere. Only 
trained artillery horses would need to be sent out. 

Such a movement would stop the exportation of cotton 



15 

from Texas to Mexico, and thence to foreign ports. With 
cotton exported to Mexico, the rebels have been able to pro- 
cure on the spot large supplies of sulphur, saltpetre, lead, 
coarse Mexican cotton goods, {manias,) Parras wine and 
brandy, leather, boots and shoes, coarse blankets, cannon 
powder and second-hand arms ; and with cotton exported 
through Mexico, they have paid for English powder and 
caps, and such other foreign supplies as they most needed. 
They would enjoy yet greater facilities for obtaining arms, 
&c., and sending out cotton, in case Mexico is occupied by 
the French. 

The army on the frontier would also serve as an army of 
observation on the French, who will probably be in posses- 
sion of the Mexican side of the valley of the Rio Grande 
before our forces can reach Texas, and would enable, by its 
occupancy, the Mexicans to get military arms and ammu- 
nition for self-defence, from abroad, through "Western Texas. 

A movement from the frontier would afford an outlet to 
the slaves, made free by the persistent rebellion of their 
masters ; and thus slavery and the slaves, so far as Texas is 
concerned, would leave the country. It would also at once 
cause the organizfition of one or more free States. This is 
provided for by the joint resolution of annexation, which 
contemplates that Texas may be subdivided. It would shut 
the back door of the rebellion, and dispose of the question 
as to the expansion of slavery, by means of filibustering 
against Mexico^ and would blockade the rebellion in the only 
region in which, by strange neglect, there has hitherto been 
no blockade. 

The Rio Grande is the best base of a campaign against 
Texas, not only because its mouth and the coast above can be 
commanded by our vessels of war, but because, in case of 
reverse, our troops can cross over on to the friendly soil of 
Mexico, where the rebels, who dare not now make war on 
Mexico, cannot pursue. The troops that will be obtained in 
Texas will, in general, be good horsemen and capital shots, 
acclimated, and accustomed to border life. As, in case they 
should be taken by the rebels, they would be hung, they may 

e counted upon as reliable, under all circumstances. 



16 

A memorandum has been furnished, showing the character 
and quantity of arms, &c., needed for the troops to be ob- 
tained in Texas. These troops can get along without tents, 
save hospital tents, and will require no trains, save for the 
arms wanted in the interior, ammunition, provisions, &c., 
requisite for the campaign. They will cheerfully dispense 
with pick-axes and spades, as they would prefer straight-for- 
ward, plain fighting, to " strategic movenaents." Finally, 
the campaign can scarcely be made to fail of complete success. 
Mr. Jefferson Davis' government has been too despotic to 
make friends ; and if the people of the frontier had had arras 
and ammunition when they were betrayed by Mr. Buchanan's 
administration, and had the treason forced upon them, they 
would have neither asked for, nor required aid. They now 
appeal for help, and are willing and ready to fight. 



Memorandum of Articles that would he necessary for Troops 
to he raised in Texas^ in case a caTnpaign is hegun on the 
Hio Grande frontier. 

1. Two light-draught gun-boats, and four lighter boats, with 
engines, fit to carry howitzers, with the arms and outfit re- 
quired for them. 

2. Three batteries of superior rifled artillery, with the 
horses and extra horses and equipments needed for them, 
with the carbines, sabres, revolvers and accoutrements for 
five hundred artillerymen. These will be required to oppose 
the rebel batteries of smooth-bore guns, some of which are 
24-pounders. 

3. 15,000 stand of infantry arms (rifles and muskets) for 
such infantry as can be raised, and for the loyal home-guard, 
to be organized and left behind the forces as they advance. 
No risk will be incurred of losing these arms, as the Rio 
Grande valley is almost unanimously loyal. 

4. 5,000 breech-loading carbines, (Maynard's preferred and 
Sharp's second-choice,) and 6,000 Colt's army pistols, with 
accoutrements. These last will be wanted for the rangers that 
will take the field, and for the officers in all branches of the 
service. 



\ 

' double-barreled guns, to be 
\ especially for night ser- 

iftj steel telescopic long-range rifles 

to ample supply of explosive Minie 

arpshooters for blowing up caissons, 

es to the windward of the enemy 

en encs japed for the night. These 

moderate Union force invincible, 

jy the enemy by any weapons they 

get. 

^^ jod ammunition, that would, in the esti- 

ance department, be deemed suflBcient, not 

^aign with the foregoing weapons, but for the 

iiecesbc ^ j^. jliminary practice. 

8. Butcher-knives, with sheaths, for each of the stands of 
arras ; also army blankets. 

9. 12,000 plain (buff or gray) flannel uniforms, to consist 
of a hunting-shirt, or blouse, pantaloons and shirt. Under- 
clothing and cotton drawers, and woollen socks, to double 
the above quantity, would be needed. Wide-awake buff 
felt hats would be preferr'jd, and shoes would be better for 
active service than boots. Metal buttons, and, indeed, every- 
thing bright, should be dispensed with. 

10. Light wagons (with gearing small enough for Mexican 
les) suflBcient to transport the foregoing articles, with 

^ .^visions for troops. 

(It is to be borne in mind, that in case the French occupy 
Northeastern Mexico before the United States expedition 
lands in Texas, the price of mules, and also of corn and for- 
age, will be much affected. It will also be more difficult to 
get them.) 

11. Tents, sufficient for hospital tents, and medicines, &c. 

12. Swords for the officers, as they cannot be had in the 
countr}'; the value to be deducted from their pay. 

13. Stationery, sufficient for the military uses, such as re- 
auisitions, lif^ts, reports, &c., as it is not to be had in the 
country. 

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